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Abstract 
UNSCR 1325 and the Women, Peace and Security agenda has been in place since 
year 2000, yet women’s participation in conflict resolution processes remains low 
and they are still largely being excluded from deciding how their future society is 
going to look like. The European Union is known for being a normative actor in 
international politics, with gender equality being one of their core norms. As they 
take a larger role in conflict resolution processes, it is interesting to study if they 
manage to decrease gender blindness in these processes and help speed up 
progress in the implementation of 1325. 
This study applies the theory of Gendering Normative Power Europe on a 
qualitative case study of the EU’s facilitation of the dialogue between Belgrade 
and Pristina, which is a case where the EU both have an interest in diffusing their 
core norms as well as it is a conflict resolution process where 1325 need to be 
implemented. The results show that, while they are not completely failing, the EU 
is not as strong an actor as would be expected in the implementation of the WPS-
agenda.  
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1   Introduction 
Perhaps what was not grasped [following the adoption of 1325], and is still 
not absorbed by the members of the delegations or by the thousands of 
officials worldwide who found 1325 lying in their inboxes, was the 
genuinely radical understanding that informed the feminist analysis 
undergirding 1325. That feminist understanding is that patriarchy […] is a 
principal cause both of the outbreak of violent societal conflicts and of the 
international community’s frequent failures in providing long-term 
resolution to those violent conflicts – (Enloe, 2005: 281) 
 
Almost two decades after the adoption of United Nations Security Council 
Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 – in which one of the central pillars is the demand of 
the inclusion of women in all levels of decision-making for the management, 
prevention and resolution of conflict – women comprise less than 10 percent of 
peace negotiators and under 4 percent of signatories to peace agreements (UNSC 
2000; Kirby & Shepherd 2016: 376). As such, women are still not allowed to on 
equal footing with men decide how their post-conflict society is going to look 
like. UNSCR 1325 was followed by seven resolutions that further elaborated on 
how the pillars outlined in 1325 would be implemented. The framework for the 
implementation of 1325 and subsequent resolutions is called the Women, Peace 
and Security (WPS) agenda and is used by women’s movements as well as 
national governments and transnational organisations worldwide. Yet, the slow 
progress has resulted in critique against the effectiveness of 1325 and the 
accusation of it only leading to an entrenchment of women’s marginalisation and 
victimisation (Puechguirbal 2010). Indeed, even when internationally powerful 
actors such as the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) set up 
ambitious action plans to follow through on the commitments given by 1325, they 
struggle to implement them (Guerrina & Wright 2016).  
A majority of the National Action Plans (NAP) on UNSCR 1325 that have 
been produced worldwide come from EU member states, and gender equality has 
since decades back been part of the normative framework of the EU (Guerrina & 
Wright 2016: 293). When the EU is increasing their visibility in conflict and post-
conflict contexts, especially as a mediator, they are both an actor probable to push 
for the WPS-agenda, based on their commitments to gender equality, as well as it 
is their responsibility to follow through on their commitments. When the EU are 
increasing their engagement as mediator in international conflicts it is of utmost 
importance that they unconditionally and from the start make sure to include 
women’s rights and participation in these post-conflict contexts. For them to do 
that, conditions that allow for gender perspectives to permeate all actions need to 
be in place.  
By adopting the theoretical framework of Gendered Normative Power Europe 
and applying velvet triangles to the analysis, this study will qualitatively assess 
  2 
how the EU have acted to mitigate gender blindness in the Dialogue on 
Normalisation of Relations between Belgrade and Pristina. The dialogue between 
Kosovo and Serbia is a case where the EU is acting both as a mediator, and the 
countries are also on a membership-path toward the European Union and is as 
such a case where the EU have an interest in diffusing their norms. This study will 
therefore seek to evaluate how the EU has mitigated gender blindness, and as such 
strived to follow their commitments under the Women, Peace and Security-
agenda in their facilitation of the Dialogue on Normalization of Relations between 
Belgrade and Pristina.  
1.1   Purpose and Research Question 
The purpose of this paper is to develop the theory on Gendering Normative Power 
Europe, by applying the theory to a specific case where in-depth findings can be 
made. This will both bridge theory between the EU and conflict resolution, their 
normative power and the WPS agenda, as well as serve as a needed analysis of 
one specific actor and their implementation of 1325 in one specific case. With the 
slow progress in the pillar of women’s participation in conflict resolution, it is 
necessary to investigate why this is and where implementation is lacking. By 
scrutinizing a clearly normative actor, with many incentives to carry through on 
aspects relating to gender, interesting findings can be made regarding, if and why, 
even such an actor fall short in ensuring women’s equal participation. The study 
will thus not focus on the effectiveness of the EU as a mediator, but rather on the 
EU as an actor in pushing for the WPS-agenda. The study emanates from research 
on the EU as a normative actor, and this case is one where the EU is driving 
gender equality in the form of a norm originating from the UN – the Women, 
Peace and Security agenda. 
 
The research question is as follows: 
 
How is gender blindness mitigated in the European Union’s work as 
facilitator in the Dialogue on Normalization of Relations between Belgrade and 
Pristina? 
 
“Mitigating gender blindness” is within the scope of this study understood as 
efforts to implement the WPS-agenda, since the agenda is the only comprehensive 
and universal framework for providing gendered responses and improving the 
participation of women in conflict resolution settings.  
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1.2   Disposition 
In the following section, 2. Theoretical Framework, literature on the EU as a 
mediator and normative actor, as well as research on the WPS-agenda will be 
outlined, as this study will advance research in these two fields. Further, the 
theory on Gendering Normative Power Europe will be presented together with the 
concept of velvet triangles. The study will be conducted through a qualitative 
content analysis using material from the EU, independent non-governmental 
organisations (NGO) in Kosovo and Serbia, as well as academic and expert 
sources, which will be further explained under section 3. Method. The 
triangulation of material ensures reliability and is necessary in case study 
research, which is the chosen strategy for the study. To situate the reader in the 
context, a background on the conflict history, the dialogue and the EU’s 
framework for implementing UNSCR 1325 is given under section 4. Background. 
Following that, in section 5. Results & Analysis results from each of the three 
categories of the content analysis will be presented. Lastly, some concluding 
remarks will be made together with suggestions for further research. 
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2   Theoretical Framework 
  
 
2.1   Previous Research 
In research on the EU as a mediator, no focus has been given to their ability in 
implementing the WPS-agenda. The research in this area is focused on their 
effectiveness in mediation regarding reaching agreements and settlements, rather 
than studying how well they are living up to their commitments of including 
women in decision-making positions in conflict resolution settings and allowing 
women to give input on relevant issues (see e.g. Bergmann & Niemann 2012; 
O’Donnell 2016; Grono 2010). In two studies assessing the EU’s mediation in the 
Russo-Georgia conflict and subsequent resolution in 2008, the EU is criticized for 
their normativity regarding Georgia’s territorial integrity, which the scholars mean 
can be regarded as partiality and would limit the EU’s mediation effectiveness 
(Forsberg & Seppo 2011: 135; Grono 2010: 7). The normative aspect of EU as a 
mediation actor is in line with the purpose of this study and as such, these are 
interesting conclusions, as the arguments made in this study is that the EU should 
rather be more normative. 
Research on Normative Power Europe was brought forward by Ian Manners 
(2002) and builds on the idea that the EU is neither a civilian or military power in 
international politics, as these are both composed of empirical factors which is not 
the EU’s strongest asset. The EU’s power lies in its ability to control what is 
considered ‘normal’ in international relations – the EU is a normative power. 
Declarations, treaties, policies, criteria and conditions build the acquis 
communautaire, the body of rights and obligations that are binding for all current 
and future EU member states. These are diffused in a number of different ways 
through the EU’s actions, one of them being ‘procedural diffusion’, meaning the 
institutionalization of a relationship with the EU and a third party – such as 
through enlargement. Manners identifies five core norms that the EU diffuses – 
the centrality of peace; the idea of liberty; democracy; rule of law; and the respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms (Manners 2002: 238-245). Following 
Manners, numerous scholars have studied the EU’s norm diffusion in their 
external actions (see e.g. Laïdi 2008; Pace 2007). Vast literature also exists on the 
EU and their work on gender equality, both within their member states as well as 
in relation to third countries (see e.g. Kantola 2010; Bretherton 2002). The studies 
show that the EU is generally better at pushing their gender equality agenda inside 
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its borders than outside, and are thus worse at what Manners called procedural 
diffusion when it comes to gender norms. This study will further contribute to 
research on the EU’s work on spreading gender norms outside its borders. 
In research on the WPS agenda, critique is directed at the seemingly over-
weight given to the protection pillar, at the cost of less emphasis given to 
participation (Kirby & Shepherd 2016: 380). Perhaps the slow progress in 
women’s participation in conflict resolution is an indicator of this, and for these 
reasons this study will focus on the participation-pillar. State-centrism in the 
implementation of the WPS agenda is another point of criticism. While many 
states have adopted NAPs to guide their fulfilment of the WPS-agenda, only one 
third of NAPs are developed with the help of civil society and 45 percent of NAPs 
mention civil society involvement (Ibid 384). Since women’s civil society 
organisations worked for decades toward the adoption of the WPS-agenda, I find 
it regretful that they are not fully included in the implementation of it. A general 
misunderstanding of 1325, such as presented in the opening quote of this essay, is 
of great concern to scholars studying the implementation of WPS. This includes 
that ‘women’ and ‘gender’ are used interchangeably in documents; essentialist 
claims of women always being proponents of peace are common; and structural 
obstacles continuously hinder real change (Puechguirbal 2010: 176, 179, 184). 
Much research on the WPS-agenda is broad and look at general trends in the 
global work that has followed 1325’s adoption. Within the research that is actor-
specific, two studies are found on the EU as an actor within the WPS-agenda. 
Karen Barnes (2011) outlines the evolution and obstacles in the EU’s work in 
creating coordinated policies regarding their implementation of 1325, and address 
that the EU is one of the most active supporters of 1325 (2011: 211-222). 
Guerrina & Wright (2016) examines how well the EU has adopted the 
implementation of the WPS-agenda into their external actions, and as this is part 
of the theoretical framework it will be further elaborated below.  
This study will contribute to widening research on the EU in conflict 
resolution, by including the aspect of their ability to implement the WPS-agenda, 
as well as add to research on WPS by looking closely at one specific case, in 
contrast to the wide studies that are dominating the research field.  
 
2.2   Gendering Normative Power Europe 
Roberta Guerrina and Katherine Wright (2016) combine what they see as two 
aspects worth examining regarding the EU as an actor in international affairs; its 
role as a promoter of gender equality in transnational settings as well as the debate 
about Normative Power Europe. They aim to examine how well the EU are at 
advancing the WPS agenda as a foreign policy objective. To Manners’ five core 
norms, presented above, Guerrina and Wright adds a sixth one – that of gender 
equality. The promotion of gender equality is part of the EU’s normative 
framework, they argue, illustrated through the inclusion of gender mainstreaming 
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in all policy areas as a core principle in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam (2016: 
293-294). However, in external policies, Guerrina and Wright find that the 
mainstreaming of gender is forgotten. There seems to be a tension between the 
EU’s rhetoric about gender equality and their failure to follow through on these 
commitments, as they see this as a possible hinder in international negotiations. 
The EU seem to be biased in their external actions, as to traditional approaches of 
security and defence rather than altering their approaches to be able to more 
radically implement 1325 (Ibid: 295). This study aims to add empirical knowledge 
to the theory, by investigating one specific case where the EU should act gendered 
normative. In Guerrina and Wright’s examining of the extent of gender 
mainstreaming in external actions they study the EU’s framework for 
implementing the WPS-agenda and use the tool of velvet triangles, which will be 
further explained below. Like Guerrina and Wright adopted velvet triangles to 
their study on the EU’s gendered normativity in their external actions in general, 
this study will adopt the velvet triangle to a specific case of EU’s external actions 
and as such develop the theory of Gendering Normative Power Europe.  
2.2.1   Velvet Triangles 
As mentioned above, Guerrina and Wright uses the theory of velvet triangles in 
their assessment of the EU as a gendered normative actor. The theory on velvet 
triangles is originally developed by Alison Woodward (2003), who argue that 
velvet triangles are crucial for women’s rights advocacy to become grounded. The 
velvet triangle can be applied globally but the version presented below is adjusted 
to the EU specifically. A velvet triangle consists of three cornerstones; 
 
1)   Femocrats – individuals positioned within the European Commission or the 
European Parliament who are motivated to work towards transformative 
change in line with feminist goals.  
2)   Civil society organizations – the established and organised women’s 
movement. 
3)   Epistemic communities – networks of professional experts with recognized 
competence in academia or other consultancies with an authoritative claim to 
policy-relevant knowledge (Guerrina & Wright 2016: 296; Woodward 2003: 
85). 
 
These networks of feminist actors in policy-making help to ensure that actors 
and institutions are held accountable and fulfil obligations on gender equality 
(Guerrina & Wright 2016: 297). The constellation involves cooperation between 
actors with different professional interests but with a commitment to promote 
gender equality and gender mainstreaming. Thus, it is much less likely that gender 
blindness can occur in policy making and policy implementation if a velvet 
triangle exists (Ibid 298). As such, the theory of velvet triangles will be used 
operationally to define the concept of “mitigating gender blindness”. If a velvet 
triangle exists in the EU’s facilitation of the dialogue between Belgrade and 
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Pristina, there is less risk that the process is being gender blind, in the form of not 
adhering to the demands of the WPS-agenda.   
Guerrina and Wright addresses that it is harder for civil society and epistemic 
communities to reach the policy area of foreign policies (2016: 298). As 
mediation and dialogue often take place behind closed doors, I would argue there 
is a risk that these parts of foreign policy become even harder to reach. This 
means there is even more reason to scrutinize the EU’s work in this area. 
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3   Method 
 
 
3.1   Qualitative Content Analysis 
In developing the theory on Gendering Normative Power Europe, this study will 
use a more qualitative approach than Guerrina and Wright. Their study is largely 
quantitative, assessing for example the attendance numbers in meetings held by 
the EEAS Task Force in Women, Peace and Security and how women are framed 
as a category in key EU policy documents on WPS. This study’s focus of one 
specific mediation effort by the EU makes a qualitative method more suitable, 
allowing to reach more in-depth knowledge.  
Content analysis allows for the systematic analysing of textual information 
and is as such a suitable method for the answering of the research question 
(Halperin & Heath 2017: 345). The theory will be applied to the material in that 
the three categories of velvet triangles, 1) femocrats, 2) civil society, and 3) 
epistemic communities will be coded in all material. The measurements are not 
quantifiable but need to be interpreted and assessed in its context due to the 
complexity of the issue, which is why a qualitative approach is fitting. The 
concrete proceeding of the content analysis is further elaborated under section 3.4. 
Operationalisation.  
The choice of a qualitative method is imperative to the internal validity of this 
study, since a quantitative approach, e.g. counting the amount of times the words 
“women” or “gender” is used in the material, would not at all measure the 
conditions for the EU to follow their 1325-commitments in conflict resolution 
contexts. In fact, that would contradict the very feminist premise that underlines 
the research question and go in line with an “add women and stir”-take on gender 
equality. The strength of the qualitative and interpretative approach is thus that the 
complex latent meanings can be discovered. Furthermore, each step of the process 
is controlled and the findings are consistently measured in relation to its context 
(Kohlbacher 2006: 14). 
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3.2   Case Study and Case Selection 
The chosen research strategy is a case study, due to the aspiration to reach depth 
and explain a highly complex context (Flyvbjerg 2006: 237; Kohlbacher 2006: 5). 
The study is inductively theory developing through the application of theory on 
Gendered Normative Power Europe by allowing categories from velvet triangles 
to guide my analysis (George & Bennet 2005: 111). Studying a case of 
international mediation develops on the findings expressed by Guerrina and 
Wright in their article on Gendering Normative Power Europe and moves the 
theory from Brussels-based findings to a concrete case of mediation.  
It being a previously somewhat low-status research strategy, several scholars 
have written work that eminently explains how case studies contribute to social 
sciences (see e.g. Flyvbjerg 2006; George & Bennet 2005; Kohlbacher 2006). 
Bent Flyvbjerg (2006) defends case studies against those who claim that they are 
weak in validity, reliability and theory and refute five common misunderstandings 
on the strategy. For example, he proves that case studies can be generalizable 
when they are a critical case – even in the predominantly more quantitative 
natural sciences (Flyvbjerg 2006: 226-227, 235). 
The selected case is the EU’s role as facilitator in the Dialogue on 
Normalisation of Relations between Belgrade and Pristina. The EU is, as 
mentioned, a normative actor in world politics and a majority of NAPs worldwide 
have been produced by EU member states. The EU themselves have also adopted 
numerous action plans and guiding documents on the implementation of 1325, 
which will be presented below. With this background, it is reasonable to believe 
that the EU in their facilitation of a dialogue would adhere to the demands given 
in the original UNSCR 1325 and in their subsequent action plans. The Belgrade-
Pristina dialogue is both part of Kosovo and Serbia’s paths toward memberships 
to the EU, as well as it is one of the EU’s current mediation efforts. This means 
that it is a case where the EU traditionally would diffuse their norms through 
procedural diffusion – as membership requires adherence to the EU’s aquis 
communautaire, as well as one where the EU is facilitating a conflict resolution 
process. As such, it is both a case where the EU would try to influence the actors 
to certain norms, as well as a case where the WPS agenda needs to be followed. 
This makes the EU’s actions in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue a most likely case 
since these factors indicate that the EU would act as a gendered normative actor 
(Gerring 2007: 232).  
Regarding external validity and generalizability, this is limited due to the 
choice of a single case study. However, the adoption of a most likely case does 
allow for some form of generalizability. As mentioned above, the EU is perhaps 
the most likely actor in the population of national and regional actors in world 
politics to follow commitments under the WPS-agenda, so if they do not – who 
would? (Flyvbjerg 2006: 231). Certainly, robust conclusions cannot be made until 
other cases are tested, but due to the relative extremity of the selected case, 
inferences drawn in this study will be relevant also outside of this single case 
(Halpering & Heath 2017: 215, 149).  
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There are more actors than the EU that have a responsibility to implement the 
WPS-agenda in the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, but the sole focus of 
this study will be on the EU. Indeed, they are merely facilitating the dialogue and 
the national governments also bear the responsibility to include women in the 
negotiating teams and to listen to women’s priorities. However, this does not 
mean that the EU’s responsibility disappears, and they are still in a unique power 
position due to the dialogue being related to Kosovo and Serbia’s accession 
processes. It is their obligation to demand from Kosovo and Serbia to make these 
efforts, and the EU should also take own initiatives to listen to women’s groups 
from the regions to hear their demands. 
3.3   Material 
For the purpose of both acquiring in-depth knowledge and to compensate for the 
potential difficulty in reaching some important pieces of documents due to the 
dialogue being on-going as well as partly behind closed doors, a large variety of 
textual sources will be used. These include written evaluations of the dialogue 
from academic or other experts, NGO reports and recommendations, EU 
statements and other communicative material produced by the EU. All material is 
such that it is relevant to the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue. Both EU material and 
material produced by independent NGOs runs the risk of being biased in different 
directions. Certainly, each piece of material will be subject to source criticism, but 
it is probably impossible to get away from the fact that the sender will have some 
sort of agenda. Triangulation of material from three different type of sources will 
be done to reduce this problem (Höglund & Öberg 2011: 191). These include: 
 
1)   Sources deriving from the EU – this includes statements and news articles 
produced primarily from the EEAS as the institution responsible for 
facilitating the dialogue. Material will also be drawn from Members of 
European Parliament (MEP), who are working toward Kosovo or Serbia 
and thus can politically pressure the EEAS on their work in the dialogue. 
2)   Independent NGOs active in Kosovo and Serbia – this includes reports and 
shorter documents such as open letters and press releases.  
3)   Professional experts – academic reports or reports produced by think-tanks 
or similar expert organisations. These will be both from the region and 
from e.g. international universities.  
 
The material sources mirror the theory, as they derive from the EU, civil 
society and epistemic communities, which should ensure that all relevant views of 
the context will be uncovered. This does not mean that information on e.g. civil 
society organisations can only come from NGO material; information on all 
aspects can be found in all sorts of material. Furthermore, seeing as the research is 
conducted in the form of a single case study, triangulation is helpful to generate a 
thick and holistic description of the case (Kohlbacher 2006: 23). 
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A limitation in the material is that only material written in English can be 
examined. Since the EU is the actor studied and material deriving from or directed 
at them will be in English, this is not a large limitation. However, it is possible 
that some fruitful analysis of the situation in Kosovo or Serbia or similar sort of 
material written in Albanian or Serbian will be excluded due to this.  
The dialogue began in March 2011 and this is the start of the time-period 
concerned. The dialogue is still ongoing but the time-period will be limited until 
March 2018, and material will be collected from this 7-year timespan.  
 
3.4   Operationalisation 
To measure how gender blindness has been mitigated, and the EU has had a 
ground for implementing the WPS-agenda in the facilitation of the dialogue 
between Belgrade and Pristina, the tool of velvet triangles is adopted. The velvet 
triangle is the operational definition of the dependent variable, as they will 
exemplify the loose concept of “mitigating gender blindness”. The three aspects 
of a velvet triangle are, as mentioned above, 1) femocrats, 2) civil society 
organizations, and 3) epistemic communities. Any information related to the three 
aspects will be coded, and the material will then be interpreted to determine if it is 
in a positive or negative manner. This will be presented under section 4. Results & 
Analysis. The qualitative and interpretative approach fits well with these rather 
open definitions (Kohlbacher 2006: 16-20).  
For the femocrats found to be relevant to the study, they must have the 
possibility to influence the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, and this can 
be both from the European Commission or the European Parliament. Regarding 
civil society organisations and epistemic communities pushing for the WPS-
agenda, this will partly be searched for in the EU’s material, to decipher if they 
seem to be an important aspect from their part. Reports and evaluations from local 
NGOs, academia and other relevant expert organisations will both reveal if civil 
society organisations as well as epistemic communities with a strong focus on 
women’s rights and gender equality are present in the region and giving focus to 
the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, as well as if and how they are included in the 
dialogue. 
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4   Background 
4.1   Conflict History 
Contested opinions over Kosovo’s territory dates back around a century, to when 
Kosovo seceded from the Ottoman Empire in 1912. According to the Serbian 
narrative, the Kosovan territory was liberated, while an Albanian narrative claims 
that Kosovo was instead occupied by Serbs. From 1918 Kosovo was part of 
Yugoslavia, where they possessed an autonomous status from 1974, different 
from the six other republics constituting the federation. In late 1980s, the Serbian 
president Slobodan Milosevic took over Kosovo’s institutions, which resulted in 
the proclamation of Kosovo Albanians as a republic within Yugoslavia in 1990, 
and an independent state in 1991 (Mehmeti & Radeljic 2016: 3-4). Clashes 
between Serbian forces and the Kosovo Albanian population followed, at first 
with a predominantly peaceful resistance from the Kosovo Albanian side. The 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a guerrilla force for freedom or a terrorist group 
depending on who you ask, initiated attacks toward the Serbian army in late 1990s 
and the conflict escalated. Between 1998 and 1999 thousands lost their lives and 
hundreds of thousands were displaced or expelled from their territory (Gashi et. 
al. 2017: 536). Sexual violence was widespread during the conflict and affected 
thousands of women (Chick 2016).  
In March 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces began 
an air-strike campaign which lasted for nearly three months, and eventually led to 
the withdrawal of Serbian forces. After the intervention, a UN administrative 
mission (UNMIK) and a NATO peacebuilding mission (KFOR) was established 
and Kosovo began developing their own state institutions. Mediations and 
negotiations between Kosovo and Serbian representatives led by the UN between 
2005 and 2007 failed, and the UN Special Envoy to Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, was 
tasked to present a proposal for the status of Kosovo. His conclusions were that an 
“independence supervised by the international community” should be Kosovo’s 
final status. On February 17th, 2008, Kosovo declared its independence, which 
Serbia opposed and questioned the legality of to the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) (Gashi et. al. 2017: 536-537; Mehmeti & Radeljic 2016: 4, 7). 
Since the breakaway of Kosovo’s territory from Serbia, the institutions in 
Kosovo has been failing to govern some municipalities in northern Kosovo, 
separated by the southern part of the country by the river Ibar, that are dominated 
by Kosovo Serbs. The Serb community rejects the authority and independence of 
the Kosovo government, and animosities have been strong and continuous 
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between the Kosovo Serb communities and the Kosovo Albanians (Burema 2012: 
10-11).  
4.2   The EU-facilitated Dialogue for the 
Normalization of Relations between Belgrade and 
Pristina 
Following Serbia’s questioning of Kosovo’s independence in 2008 before the ICJ, 
and them refusing to accept that the ICJ did not find the declaration illegal, the 
UN adopted a resolution which obliged the EU to facilitate a dialogue between 
Belgrade and Pristina aimed at normalizing relations between the two countries 
(Beha 2015: 102-103). The overall aims set up by the EU for the dialogue are 
threefold, 1) promote cooperation between the two sides, 2) help them achieve 
progress on the path to Europe, and 3) improve the lives of the people (EEAS 
2016). The dialogue began in March 2011 and has consisted of a series of talks 
between the two governments, with a number of agreements on technical issues 
being reached, such as on freedom of movement and the reciprocity of license 
plates; civil registries; custom stamp procedures; cadastral records; acceptance of 
university diplomas; and regional representation and cooperation (Phillips 2017: 
8). The dialogue began with a technical focus, as a way of trying to de-politicize 
it, due to the extreme sensitivity in relations between the countries. While even 
the smallest of technical details were being subjected to blocking from the parties, 
it was evident that the dialogue will have strong political consequences no matter 
what issues are being discussed. Nonetheless, a strong focus has continuously 
been given to technical factors (van der Borgh et. al. 2017: 39). Two years into the 
dialogue, the so-called Brussels agreement1 was reached which is considered the 
biggest success of the negotiations so far (Economides & Ker-Lindsay 2015: 
1028). The agreement consists of 15 points that addresses the accommodation of 
Serbs in northern Kosovo; groups that before this refused any authority of the 
Government of Kosovo. The agreement is historic in that it is the first agreement 
reached and signed between Kosovo and Serbia (Mehmeti & Radeljic 2016: 8).  
The dialogue has been used as an incentive in the two Balkan-countries’ 
processes toward membership of the EU, since the EU demand that all interstate 
conflicts or disputes are solved before entering the Union. Indeed, the signing of 
the Brussels agreement has led to Serbia starting their accession negotiations and 
Kosovo reaching a Stabilization Association Agreement (Gashi et. al. 2017: 534). 
As mentioned briefly under previous research, the success of the dialogue is 
questioned. The last year has seen some troubling events, such as the murder of a 
Kosovo Serb politician in Kosovo and a provocation from Serbia by sending a 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
1 The full name of the agreement is First Agreement of principles governing the normalization of relations 
between Belgrade and Pristina 
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train into Kosovo covered in the text “Kosovo is Serbia” (Phillips 2017: 14; 
MacDowall 2016). A strong criticism against the dialogue has been its lack of 
transparency and inclusion. Information reaching the public has been lacking, and 
negative sentiments against the dialogue being predominantly top-down has been 
expressed (Development Group 2012: Phillips 2017). A survey conducted in 
2014, one year after the Brussels agreement was reached, by the National 
Democratic Institute (NDI) in Kosovo, indicated that Kosovars were at most 
mildly optimistic on the expected results of the agreement, where the most 
negative attitudes were found among Kosovar Serbs in the North of Kosovo (NDI 
2014).  
The EU has collaborated with other actors during the dialogue. The United 
States (US) has been involved, in varied capacity, due to their strong support 
toward Kosovo. The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), 
has also helped in implementation some technical aspects of agreements (Phillips 
2017: 15; Deda & Qosaj-Mustafa 2014; 5). 
Finally, conflict resolution and mediation between Kosovo and Serbia is 
clearly an immensely complex matter. As such it is daring of the EU to even begin 
a dialogue with the aim to normalize relations between the two countries. What 
further complicates the matter is the fact that not only conflict resolution between 
the two countries is necessary, but reconciliation between Kosovar Albanians and 
Kosovar Serbs is also lacking (Burema 2012: 11-12; Crisis Group 2012: 3). 
Despite critique directed toward the EU’s achievements during the dialogue, some 
would argue that getting the representatives of Kosovo and Serbia in the same 
rooms and holding meetings in “a good atmosphere”, an expression often used by 
the EU representatives, is perhaps progress enough (Van der Borgh et. al. 2017: 
71). 
 
4.3   The European Union’s Commitments Under the 
Women, Peace and Security-agenda 
The EU’s framework for implementation of 1325 and subsequent resolutions 
consists of two main documents; Comprehensive approach to the EU 
implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 and 1820 
on women, peace and security and Implementation of UNSCR 1325 as reinforced 
by UNSCR 1820 in the context of ESDP. Three main aspects are identified as 
priorities in the EU’s implementation of 1325; 1) the integration of WPS issues in 
dialogue with partner governments, particularly those affected by conflict, 2) 
mainstreaming of gender, especially in relation to crisis management and 
development, and 3) support for specific strategic actions intended to protect, 
support and empower women. The first point is a typical example of what 
Manners (2002) would call procedural diffusion of norms to third party 
governments. The Comprehensive approach state that the EU will strive towards 
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greater number of women as mediators and chief mediators as well as involve 
women at all decision-making levels, and it recognizes the valuable resource that 
women’s peace efforts are at local and national levels (Council of the European 
Union 2008). In the EU’s Strategic Engagement for Gender Equality 2016-2019, 
one of their key priorities listed is “promoting gender equality and women’s rights 
across the world”, which also shows that the EU are striving to diffuse norms on 
gender equality outside its borders (European Union 2015). Regarding mediation, 
the Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities mentions 
the promotion of participation of women and inclusion of gender expertise in 
mediation efforts, which shows that the WPS-framework is present in that 
document as well (Council of the European Union 2009). 
Critique that Guerrina and Wright (2016) direct at the EU’s framework is that 
they are lacking in ambition, since they have not been updated following six of 
the eight resolutions on WPS. They have not been updated following the Lisbon 
Treaty of 2009 and the creating of EEAS as the main institution for external 
policies either. Moreover, in the Comprehensive approach, women and gender are 
used synonymously, indicating a lack of understanding on the concept of gender. 
The Implementation of UNSCR 1325 furthermore is based on a resolution that 
frames sexual violence in a problematic way which has been updated in later 
resolutions, that are not taken into account in the EU’s policy document (305-
307). 
The framework outlined above is applicable, and ought to have been applied, 
to the EU’s action as mediator between Belgrade and Pristina. In the context of a 
conflict resolution process, the framework of implementing the WPS-agenda 
ought to be followed for the EU to diffuse their norms of gender equality. This 
study will not in detail determine if these factors have been enforced, but will 
rather investigate whether a velvet triangle, so to prevent gender blindness in the 
form of not applying the WPS-framework, is present in the context of the 
dialogue. However, it is quite inevitable that some conclusions will be made 
regarding indicators of the EU’s implementation of WPS, and it is valuable to 
have the EU’s commitments in mind while looking at the results.  
  16 
5   Results & Analysis 
 
5.1   Femocrats 
The Dialogue on Normalization of Relations Between Belgrade and Pristina is led 
by the EEAS with the HR/VP as chief negotiator. As chief negotiator, there is 
room to set the agenda and decide which issues to bring forth, and as such it is of 
interest to see if any of the three chief negotiators so far – Robert Cooper, 
Catherine Ashton and Federica Mogherini – have been working toward 
transformative change in line with feminist goals. 
There is no information found in the material that indicates that either Robert 
Cooper or Federica Mogherini is pushing for transformative change in line with 
feminist goals. Catherine Ashton have during the time she held the position as 
HR/VP pushed for the WPS-agenda in some instances. In an open letter from a 
Swedish, a Kosovar and a Serbian women’s rights organisation, she was 
acknowledged for her previous engagement for women’s participation and 
women’s rights. The letter acknowledges that the EU has excluded women’s 
organisations from giving input to the dialogue, that they have failed to gender 
mainstream any agreements reached so far, and that they as such are failing to 
implement UNSCR 1325 (KWN et. al. 2013). Ashton responded to this letter and 
in her response, a feminist agenda regarding the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue is 
visible. She writes to reassure on the EU’s commitment to implement UNSCR 
1325 and to promote women’s rights. The letter also addresses that women 
possess some key positions in the dialogue from both the EU, Serbian and 
Kosovan side. During Ashton’s time as HR/VP, she collaborated with the 
Secretary of State to the US at the time, Hillary Clinton, who also is known for 
advocating women’s rights. Ashton reveals in her letter that she and Clinton met 
with female politicians and leaders in Pristina during a joint visit to the region on 
31 October 2012, and that she hopes to meet with the organisations that addressed 
her with a letter on her next visit (A (2013)). There is unfortunately no 
information found on whether this meeting happened, and most other material 
suggest very limited inclusion of women’s civil society organisations. This 
material does however imply that a window of opportunity existed in the 
dialogue, regarding implementation of the WPS-agenda, when both Catherine 
Ashton and Hillary Clinton held key positions. When two of the highest positions 
in the negotiations were held by two women with transformative feminist 
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agendas, conditions for a strong implementation of the WPS-agenda was 
promising.  
No information is found on whether Federica Mogherini continued this path 
when she replaced Ashton as HR/VP. The fact that the chief negotiators during 
most parts of the dialogue have been women has a value in itself, since statistics 
of women negotiators which is exceptionally low, as illustrated in the 
introduction. However, only one of the chief negotiators have clearly expressed an 
explicit interest in pushing for a transformative feminist agenda, and as such only 
one of the chief negotiators has shown indicators of acting as a femocrat, as 
defined by the theory.   
Except from the chief negotiators, no women are currently represented in the 
negotiating teams, according to a recent analysis made by two women’s 
organisations from Kosovo and Serbia (Pescanik & MWAHR 2018). Edita Tahiri 
was the Minister of Dialogue in Kosovo and as such leading the Kosovo 
negotiating team until fall of 2017. Studying actors from the national teams is 
beyond the scope of this essay, but seeing as Edita Tahiri is the chair of the 
Regional Women’s Lobby for Peace, Security and Justice in Southeast Europe 
(RWL SEE) (see more under 4.3. Civil Society Organisations), it is possible that 
she had an agenda of including women’s perspectives in the dialogue (RWL SEE 
2015a).  
Interestingly, Guerrina and Wright (2016) in their study in EU’s gendered 
normativity in external relations in general, found that femocrats seemed to exist 
in a larger extent in the European Parliament than the European Commission 
(2016: 303). This could be damaging to the implementation of the WPS-agenda, 
since it is the EEAS under the European Commission that are responsible for all 
foreign actions and as such would benefit from committed feminists to mitigate 
gender blindness in their implementation work. In this case, a possible femocrat 
were found in the European Parliament, who has been working toward Kosovo 
and Serbia and as such has had the ability to put political pressure on the 
executors of the dialogue. Outgoing MEP Ulrike Lunacek from Austria has been a 
member of the Parliamentary Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender 
Equality (FEMM) and the Delegation for relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Kosovo (DSEE), and she raises violence against women in reports and 
speeches related to Kosovo’s accession process (EP 2017, A8-0062/2017). She 
has however not mentioned women’s participation and inclusion in the dialogue, 
and it is perhaps striking that someone who is driven by improving women’s 
rights and gender equality, and who is invested in Kosovo, do not bring up the 
deficit in the EU’s implementation of the WPS-agenda in the Kosovo-Serbia 
dialogue.  
The organisations Mitrovica Women’s Association for Human Rights 
(MWAHR) in Kosovo and Women’s Association Pescanik in Serbia are 
implementing a project aimed at increasing the participation of women in the 
Belgrade-Pristina dialogue. In their narrative report for the project during 2017, 
they report on challenges regarding getting representatives of the EU to 
participate after inviting them to their activities. One EU representative they did 
reach and who participated in a training on “EU integration and gender equality” 
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with great satisfaction was Ana Milenic who is the Contact person for human 
rights and Gender focal point in the EU Delegation in Serbia. The organisations 
report that the participants very much appreciated her compliance in listening to 
their experiences (Women’s Association Pescanik 2018). This is a positive result 
as it implies that there are EU-representatives in the countries concerned by the 
dialogue that allow women’s organisations to provide input to the dialogue.  
Of course, there is a possibility that the EU has taken more initiatives than can 
be found in the results regarding the inclusion of women’s perspectives. The 
theoretical background of this study does however imply that if such initiatives 
were taken, representatives of the EU would want to display them. Due to their 
normative power, and gender equality arguably being one of their core norms, any 
initiatives taken to bring the WPS-agenda forward would be a perfect opportunity 
to symbolically present to the public that they are including these perspectives in 
their work as facilitator of the dialogue.  
5.2   Civil Society Organisations 
As mentioned above, the dialogue has received critique for not including civil 
society sufficiently. Indeed, an evaluation that the EU themselves have ordered, 
highlights that contact made by the facilitation team with local civil society has 
been limited (ECDMP 2011:15). If civil society organisations in general are not 
included in the dialogue, women’s organisations specifically are evidently not 
included either. The following results show that the women’s movements in both 
Kosovo and Serbia are strong and have a great interest in contributing to the 
Belgrade – Pristina dialogue. 
An open letter, directed at the chief negotiator at the time, Catherine Asthon 
was written by Serbian, Kosovar and Swedish women’s rights organisations in 
2013. It expresses concern regarding the lack of participation of women’s 
organisations in the dialogue and state that such exclusion come at a price since it 
leaves out the potential and expertise of the women’s movement and decreases the 
legitimacy of the agreements reached within the dialogue. They bring up that 
women’s priorities, e.g. survivors of conflict related sexual violence and missing 
persons since the war, have not been addressed and that when issues that greatly 
affect women are discussed, women’s organisations have not been allowed to give 
input. These issues include health, education, economics at social rights. They 
relate to UNSCR 1325 and imply that the EU are failing to implement it (KWN et. 
al. 2013).  
There are projects being implemented parallel with the dialogue with the aim 
of either influencing the national and EU decision-makers, or to enhance 
normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia outside of the dialogue. 
The organisations MWAHR in Kosovo and Women’s Association Pescanik in 
Serbia have a project aiming to increase the participation of women in peace 
building and to inform citizens from Kosovo and Serbia on what has been 
achieved so far in the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue. In the scope of the project, 
  19 
recommendations have been produced and distributed to national and EU 
authorities (Pescanik & MWAHR 2018). It is too soon to tell if the EU will listen 
to the recommendations.  
RWL SEE has through similar projects gathered women from civil society, at 
local or national decision-making positions and other leadership positions from 
both Kosovo and Serbia, aiming to increase the involvement of civil society and 
minority groups in the dialogue. RWL SEE has released recommendations 
directed to national governments, the EU, the UN and other relevant international 
organisations. The recommendations include measures on implementing 1325 
such as making sure that women voices are heard throughout the dialogue (RWL 
SEE 2015 a&b).  
The recommendations and demands from the above-mentioned projects and 
open letters address that women’s voices need to be heard regarding issues that 
affect women; that women should be increasingly involved in the dialogue; that 
all agreements reached have been subjected to citizen involvement during all 
phases from consultation to implementation; increased transparency and 
information-sharing on the results of the negotiations; increased funds to women’s 
organisations; and the mainstreaming of UNSCR 1325 into all future agreements. 
Since these recommendations have been given at different times during the 
dialogue, it is implied that the EU has not listened to the recommendations or 
become better at including women’s organisations perspectives.  
These results show that the conditions of an established and organised 
women’s movement exist in Kosovo and Serbia. They are both experts on their 
own needs and demands and have already been working on reconciliation 
between their communities for years. As the open letters state, the dialogue will 
have trouble gaining ground and reach sustainable results if the civil society is 
addressed and if women’s priorities are not considered. In her letter, Catherine 
Ashton implied that she would meet with women’s organisations on her future 
visits to the region, but no information of these meetings is recorded in the 
material and it is thus not possible to say whether this inclusion took place or not. 
UNSCR 1325 and subsequent resolutions demand the inclusion of women at 
decision-making positions at all levels, and usually the top-levels are where the 
least number of women participate. It is interesting in this case that it seems like 
the EU have done the opposite – the chief negotiators have been mostly women 
but few women are included on the grassroots level. The exclusion of women’s 
civil society organisations in dialogue does however reflect what was found in 
previous research on the WPS-agenda; that the women’s movement, who largely 
made the agenda possible, are to a large extent not included in its implementation.  
On the 13th of March 2018, the EU published a Call for Project Ideas, 
encouraging established local civil society organisations from Kosovo and Serbia 
to submit their ideas. This is the first instance found in the material where the EU 
are seeking civil society organisation’s contribution to the dialogue. They seek 
projects that communicate to the public on the benefits of the dialogue, that 
encourage debates on all levels on how the dialogue can affect relations between 
Belgrade and Pristina, as well as sharpen interaction between various actors from 
Kosovo and Serbia. One of the criteria is to target “both information and 
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interaction among individuals and communities, including women and youth, and 
promote equal opportunities”, which shows an effort to actively include women’s 
perspectives. This is a step in the right direction toward including the established 
local women’s movement to the dialogue and as such prevent gender blindness 
(European Union 2018).  
5.3   Epistemic Communities 
 
Networks of professional experts with recognized competence in academia or 
other consultancies with gender-specific focus are a bit harder to find in the 
material. Of the implementation reviews and evaluations found on the dialogue 
none had a specific focus on performing a gender analysis of the dialogue. Some 
implementation reviews bring up the need to include civil society in a larger 
extent, which is positive as this would open up for an involvement from women’s 
civil society organisations.  
David Phillips (2017) of the Institute for the Study of Human Rights at the 
University of Columbia, has conducted an implementation review of the Kosovo-
Serbia dialogue where recommendations are given on ways to improve the results. 
On critical issues that need to be addressed, missing persons are one such issue. 
This is also an issue that the women’s organisations in the region have demanded 
action on, and it is as such positive that this is brought up in the implementation 
review. The review furthermore addresses that all forms of trafficking should be 
addressed when security issues are on the table; and since trafficking often 
disproportionally affects women, this is a positive recommendation (UN News 
2016; Phillips 2017: 4). In the review, there is a list of what Kosovo and Serbia 
respectively want, but this do not address gender-specific demands and is as such 
inadequate (Ibid 18-19). Under recommendations directed at affected populations 
and civil society, Phillips acknowledge that some focus should be given to youth, 
women and culture, as well as to “women’s issues”. One of the recommendations 
toward the EU is to set up a fund for financing track two activities, which as 
mentioned above was announced in March 2018. Perhaps this implementation 
review and others like it has informed the EU’s decision to fund civil society 
projects, which illustrate that epistemic communities could influence the EU and 
as such it is important that gender expertise exists even there (Ibid 22-23).  
A number of implementation reviews found, written by epistemic 
communities, have a highly technical focus (see e.g. Deda & Qosaj-Mustafa 2013; 
Todocric & Malazogu 2011). As technical aspects have been at the centre of the 
dialogue, this merely implies that the epistemic communities are reflecting the 
EU’s work. Thorough gender analysis of the conflict, or assessments of gendered 
aspects of each agreement, is missing. This is perhaps an indicator that the 
epistemic communities have a weaker gender focus than the civil society 
organisations, but it does also reflect back to the EU’s poor work in addressing 
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gendered aspects of the conflict and conflict resolution in the dialogue and in the 
agreements.  
EULEX provides technical support to the EU in implementing some of the 
technical agreements reached, for example the Brussels agreement, and as such 
they can be considered an expert consultancy. Their support to the dialogue 
includes assisting the integration of former Serbian police staff into Kosovo 
Police; a process in which EULEX provides basic orientation training courses for 
the integrated officers. EULEX also supports integration of Serbian judiciary 
authorities into Kosovo structures and the integration of Civil Protection staff 
operating in northern Kosovo into Kosovo structures. In this work, EULEX helps 
the selection of judges, prosecutors, support staff and staff for various Kosovo 
institutions and support technical steps taken in all these processes (EULEX a). 
Seeing as a gender adviser works at EULEX and that EULEX has provided 
support to Kosovo’s security sector on gender-based violence and violence against 
women (EULEX b), there is hope that these measures are taken with a strong 
awareness of gendered implications, for example by including special training in 
the integration of police officers. However, this is not explicitly stated anywhere 
and thus it is unclear whether EULEX’s gender expertise has been used.  
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is the 
world’s largest regional security organisation, and as such does also qualify as an 
expert consultancy. The OSCE has launched a project for strengthening women 
peacemakers between Kosovo and Serbia, that is not part of the EU-led dialogue 
but that runs parallel to it and may contribute to enhancing the normalisation 
process. In their project, women MPs; journalists, university professors and 
leading civil society activists have met on several occasions and the idea is that 
the women participating are role models for members of their communities, as 
promoters of peace, tolerance and reconciliation. The goal is to have a continuing 
dialogue to strengthen confidence-building and networking between the societies 
(OSCE 2016). The OSCE and the EU has since decades back had strong 
collaborations with each other, and when the OSCE is implementing a project in 
Kosovo and Serbia that directly relates to the EU’s ongoing dialogue between 
Belgrade and Pristina, that looks like a perfect opportunity for another 
collaboration, and this project could increase the presence of women in the EU-
led dialogue.  
UN Women, a UN organisation dedicated to gender equality and the 
empowerment of women, are also active in the region and is due to their UN-
status considered an expert organisation. Their work in Serbia is mostly focused 
on empowering migrants and refugees, but in Kosovo they have a stronger 
conflict resolution-perspective and are addressing the EU-led dialogue between 
Belgrade and Pristina. They have funded the RWL SEE project on women’s 
perspective in relation to the Brussels agreement, and is as such an actor that has 
the potential to positively influence the EU in their WPS-implementation. Since 
the WPS-agenda is originally a UN-norm, UN Women is especially relevant here 
(UN Women a & b).  
Regarding the academic part of epistemic communities, the lack of gender 
perspectives in previous research on the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia 
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does suggest that there is perhaps a lack of scholars with recognised gender 
expertise who are studying this dialogue. These results do not necessarily mean 
that no epistemic communities of gender experts exist in the region who are 
concerned with the dialogue, but they were not found in this research. 
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6   Discussion & Concluding Remarks 
This study has inductively developed the theory on Gendering Normative Power 
Europe, as an in-depth case study has highlighted the EU’s gendered normative 
power in a specific conflict resolution setting. The results have shown varied 
presence of the aspects that would mitigate gender blindness, understood through 
the velvet triangle, for the EU’s implementation of the WPS-agenda in the 
dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. Some concluding discussions will be 
presented below.  
The possible femocrats from the European Parliament and the European 
Commission mentioned are to some extent pursuing transformative feminist 
agendas on other issues, but are not applying this agenda to the dialogue. It is 
almost as if the EU does not recognise the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue as a case 
where the WPS-agenda should be implemented, which is remarkable since it is a 
typical case of a post-conflict context where a conflict resolution process could 
create a window of opportunity for the lives of women to improve through their 
inclusion in shaping the future society. The exception is Catherine Ashton, who 
during her time as HR/VP showed commitment to the WPS-agendas 
implementation on the dialogue. Since she was the chief negotiator, these are 
promising results, but they are still not compensating for the blindness and 
exclusion found in much other work on the dialogue.  
However, there is hope. On the local EU-level, a representative of the EU 
Delegation in Serbia has been participating in events organised by the local 
women’s rights organisations and have been listening to these women’s priorities. 
The EU’s Call for project ideas does also imply that there will be a greater 
inclusion of civil society organisations in the dialogue in the future, which will 
allow for greater participation by the women’s movement and further mitigate 
gender blindness. Regarding epistemic communities, there are opportunities for 
the EU to draw on the expertise of especially EULEX, since is a EU-mandated 
mission. The OSCE and UN Women are also possible collaboration partners that 
could help bring the perspectives of women peacemakers forward, and who are 
already working together with women’s civil society organisations. That this has 
not been done so far is however unfavourable for the implementation of the WPS-
agenda, as it limits the contact between the three aspects of a velvet triangle and 
as such does not allow gender-conscious actions to be permeated.  
Furthermore, critique directed at the EU regarding the dialogue is mainly on 
the lack of inclusion and transparency, and if large amounts of the populations 
feel excluded the legitimacy of the results reached within the dialogue is 
undermined. The perspectives within this study imply that the EU would increase 
their success as an actor in conflict resolution, were they playing on their 
normative power more and pushed for the inclusion of people’s perspectives. The 
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EU’s policy documents on WPS-implementation and their Concept on 
Strengthening Mediation and Dialogue Capacities both include the demands to 
ensure women’s participation at all levels, which shows the connection between 
sustainable conflict resolution and the implementation of WPS, and implies that 
the EU would perhaps be more successful as a mediator between Belgrade and 
Pristina if they increased their commitment to the WPS-agenda.  
Guerrina and Wright express in their original article on Gendering Normative 
Power Europe that the EU’s failure to follow through on their commitments to 
WPS is due to their belief that this is a possible hinder in international 
negotiations. Although this is unfortunate, since it may result in a lack of progress 
in the agenda, perhaps it is due to the EU being a relatively new actor in 
international mediation. One could hope that as the EU become more comfortable 
in their role as mediator, they will be more comfortable bringing up these 
important issues. It is also interesting to consider the future of the EU’s normative 
power in general – if they will continue to bring forward their norms as a strong 
power aspects, or if these results imply that other forms of leverage and power 
will become a stronger part of EU in the future.  
Being a most-likely case, the conclusions are rather dire, even if a generalising 
inference is not supported by one single case. However, with the EU being an 
actor likely to take the WPS-agenda forward, preferably in a rather radical 
manner, and them failing to do so is disappointing from the perspective of 
reaching progress in the implementation of WPS. With the progress of 
participation of women in conflict resolution processes being so slow, this is 
especially damaging. The biggest issue regarding the implementation of the WPS-
agenda in this case does not seem to be that the aspects of a velvet triangle does 
not exist, but that there is a lack of engagement from the EU’s side on seeing this 
dialogue as a perfect opportunity in which to advance progress on women’s 
participation in conflict resolution. As the sharp quote by Cynthia Enloe that 
started this essay highlights, and which becomes increasingly clear while studying 
a rather gender blind conflict resolution process; patriarchy is not only a cause of 
the outbreak of violent conflict, but also of the “international community’s 
frequent failure in providing long-term resolutions to those violent conflicts”.  
Finally, this study cannot make any certain conclusions on the detailed level of 
engagement and aspects for the EU to implement the WPS-agenda, due to the 
limited scope of the research. Other methods could reach even more in-depth 
findings and stronger conclusions; such as a discourse analysis on those from the 
European Parliament or the European Commission who are working with the 
dialogue, or a field study in Kosovo and Serbia to reach greater insight in the 
organisations and expert consultancies that are concerned with the dialogue and 
how they experience their inclusion or lack of inclusions from the EU. It was 
unfavourable for the study that the EU have not produced any evaluation report on 
what has been done in the dialogue, as this could have been used to more clearly 
see which measures the EU has taken and assess these. Furthermore, with the 
dialogue still being on-going, there is still time for the EU to make sure that the 
WPS-agenda is being implemented. However, I would argue that it is rather 
telling that they haven’t paid more attention to it so far.  
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6.1   Future Research 
As research on Gendering Normative Power Europe is still young, this could well 
do to be taken further, such as through similar case studies on other contexts 
where the EU are in a position to diffuse norms on gender equality and women’s 
rights. To build on the idea of this being a most likely case, other regional actors 
and their implementation of the Women, Peace and Security-agenda could also be 
studied, to reach a bigger picture of the progress in implementing the agenda by 
prominent actors in international politics. I find velvet triangles to be a useful 
theoretical tool in those sort of studies, and this could thus be applied to other 
organisations or institutions. Regarding the case of the dialogue between Belgrade 
and Pristina, studies can be conducted on the gendered aspects of the agreements 
reached so far or on the impact on the dialogue from the projects from civil 
society that will be conducted in the future. 
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